ABSTRACT. There has been a remarkable evolution in environment-related policy-making at both national and international levels during the ten years since the Report of the Brundtland Commission formulated its wellknown appeal for sustainable development. This article examines three developments in industrialized countries which appear to be closely associated with national efforts to engage with sustainable development: (1) the preparation of national environmental policy plans and strategies for sustainable development; (2) the growth of patterns of multi-partite environmental governance; and (3) the emergence of Sustainable Cities and Local Agenda 21 initiatives. It is argued that these phenomena, as well as a series of other important changes in approaches to the management of environmental burdens now occurring in contemporary societies, require serious attention from political scientists.
Introduction
During the last week of June 1997, the United Nations General Assembly held a "Special Session to Review the Implementation of Agenda 21" (UNGASS). The purpose of the gathering was to assess international progress in addressing environment-anddevelopment related issues over the five years since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio. Agenda 21 was the ambitious "action plan" adopted by government leaders at this 1992 Rio "Earth Summit" (United Nations, 1993) . Outputs from the meeting in New York included a short "Statement of Commitment" which pledged to maintain the "global partnership established at UNCED," and reaffirmed that Agenda 21 remained "the fundamental program of action for achieving sustainable development" (UNGASS, 1997: paras. 3,5.) . There was also a sober review of international efforts to implement Agenda 21 which noted points on which progress had been made, identified areas requiring urgent international action, and fixed the work plan for the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) for the five years leading up to the next comprehensive review of Agenda 21, scheduled for 2002.
To the extent that the meeting in New York was covered by the media, reports were generally bleak-highlighting the magnitude of the environment-and-development related problems which confront world leaders; the simmering disputes between North and South over issues such as overseas development assistance, technology transfer, and the adoption of innovative financial instruments to fund sustainable development; and the generalized reluctance of states to commit to binding time-tables and plans of action. Much was made of the last-minute scrapping of a "Draft Political Statement from Heads of State and Government." Above all, the depressing atmosphere of "real-politik" and diplomatic horse-trading that permeated UN headquarters in 1997 was contrasted with the enthusiasm and idealism that predominated in Rio five years earlier.
On the basis of such reports one might conclude that international efforts to address environment-and-development problems have largely stalled, and that the politics of sustainable development represents little more than rhetoric (Thomas, 1996) . And yet the decade since the report of the Brundtland Commission (WCED, 1987) first popularized the notion of sustainable development has seen a remarkable evolution of environment-related policy-making at both the international and national level. The Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biodiversity have both come into force, while institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD have devoted increasing attention to environment-and-development related issues (World Bank, 1994; OECD, 1995) . At the national level there has been continuing institutional innovation, experiments with a range of new environmental policy instruments, and attempts to integrate economic and environmental factors in decision-making.
In this article I would like to examine three recent developments in the industrialized countries which are closely associated with national efforts to engage with sustainable development, the UNCED process, and the implementation of Agenda 21. These are: (1) national environmental policy plans and strategies for sustainable development; (2) multi-partite environmental governance; and (3) Sustainable Cities and Local Agenda 21 initiatives. After discussing each of these phenomena, I will make some general observations about ongoing efforts to come to grips with environmental problems in industrialized societies. Such matters are already of high political salience, and are likely to become more prominent in the future. They raise interesting and challenging questions which political science is only beginning to address.
National Environmental Policy Plans and Strategies for Sustainable Development
Over the past decade, governments of many industrialized countries have initiated processes to draw up national environmental policy plans or national strategies for sustainable development. Table 1 lists examples of these efforts along with other institutional innovations in environment and sustainable-development-related policy-making for seven selected countries. 1 The formal objective of these plans and strategies is to allow a more comprehensive, integrated, and long-term approach to managing environmental burdens and to reconciling the economic, social and environmental dimensions of development. While domestic experience and politics have played a key role in prompting states to adopt a more expansive and systematic approach to addressing environmental issues, the trend has been actively encouraged by international contacts and organizations. Agenda 21 explicitly called upon governments to elaborate "national strategies, plans, policies and processes" to achieve sustainable development, arguing that national strategies "should build upon and harmonize the various sectoral economic, social and environmental policies and plans that are operating in the country" (United Nations, 1993) . The system of national reporting to UNCSD on Agenda 21 implementation, the crosssectoral exigencies of complying with complex accords such as the Climate Change Countries (1989-97 and Biodiversity Conventions, and initiatives like the rolling program of OECD national "Environmental Performance Reviews," have all contributed toward this trend (OECD, 1996) . The best-known examples of such national plans and strategies are the Netherlands National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP) and Canada's Green Plan. The first NEPP was published in 1989, after nearly two years of preparatory work directed by the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning, and Environment (VROM). The plan offered a comprehensive approach to managing environmental burdens in the Netherlands, with a stated objective "to solve or gain control of environmental problems within the duration of one generation" (NEPP, 1989: 7) . Human impacts on the natural world were discussed from the perspective of various ecological scales-"local, regional, fluvial, continental and global"-and remedial action was presented under eight thematic headings: "climate change," "acidification," "eutrophication," "diffusion of substances," "waste disposal," "dehydration," "squandering" (of resources), and "disturbance" (noise, odor). The NEPP contains explicit targets and timetables, and the budgetary and macro-economic implications of the policies were examined. The strengthening of provisions on CO 2 and NO emissions by an incoming government led to the publication of NEPP+ in 1990, and further iterations of the national environmental planning process (NEPP2 and NEPP3) appeared in 1993 and 1998.
Canada's Green Plan was presented to Parliament in December 1990 after 18 months of discussion and consultation (Canada, 1990) . The plan introduced about a hundred specific environmental projects, anticipating an additional expenditure of 3 billion Canadian dollars over a five-year period. 2 According to one close observer of the Green Plan process, the eight chapters of the plan are best understood under two headings: (1) proposals to deal with specific environmental problems ("Air, Water and Land"; "Renewable Resources"; "Special Species and Spaces"; "The Arctic"; "Global Environmental Security"; and "Emergency Preparedness"); and (2) proposals to improve decision-making and to institutionalize concern with sustainable development ("Environmentally Responsible Decision-Making"; and "Our Own House") (see Toner, 1997) . While the Green Plan was sponsored by Environment Canada, it was a document of the government as a whole, and spending was allocated across a range of departments (Toner and Doern, 1994) .
Many other countries have now adopted environmental policy plans and strategies for sustainable development (Dalal-Clayton, 1996) . In August 1990, for example, the Australian government initiated a complex consultation process that ultimately gave rise to an Australian National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development, which was endorsed officially by the Council of Australian Governments in December 1992. The strategy document (which was accompanied by a compendium relating its provisions to 500 policy recommendations formulated by nine "Ecologically Sustainable Development Working Groups"), was organized in three main sections: an Introduction, discussing basic goals and principles; a section on "Sectoral Issues" devoted to resource-dependent sectors (agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, mining, urban and transportation, tourism, and energy); and a section on "Inter-sectoral Issues" which dealt with 22 important thematic areas relevant to sustainable development, including "native vegetation," "land use planning and decision-making," "environmental impact assessment," "water resource management," "gender issues," "occupational health and safety," "Australia's International Co-operation and Development Assistance Policy," and "population issues" (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992 (UK Government, 1990; . Japan adopted a new Basic Environment Law in 1993, and issued its first Environment Basic Plan in 1994 (Japan, 1995 ). Denmark's political authorities published an early action plan on environment and development in 1988, and in 1995 they moved to supplement sectoral action-plans adopted over the intervening years with a more extensive policy document, Denmark's Nature and Environment Policy (Denmark, 1995) . In New Zealand, an important strategy paperEnvironment 2010 Strategy-was published by the Government in 1995-(New Zealand Ministry of the Environment, 1995). 3 In comparison with earlier ventures in environmental policy-making, such plans and strategies share a number of features. First, they adopt a more comprehensive approach, attempting to assess and propose management options for the sum of environmental burdens within the national territory. Second, they have substantial integrative ambitions: the idea is to match biophysical and social inter-dependencies with analytical, regulatory, and remedial strategies based on cross-disciplinary, cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional action. Third, they adopt a long-range approach, focusing directly on the next four or five years, but considering possible scenarios twenty, thirty or fifty years into the future. The intent is to begin to come to terms with long-term environmental degradation and with structurally embedded patterns of human activity that are amenable only to gradual change. Fourth, national problems and policy proposals are discussed within the context of international initiatives and the obligation to contribute to global solutions to environment-and-development related problems. And finally, the idea of "sustainable development" provides a key conceptual anchor for these plans and strategies, furnishing a context for the integration of environmental and economic decisionmaking, and emphasizing a preoccupation with the life support and amenity functions of the environment, and a concern with the needs of future generations. Typically, explicit reference is made to the Brundtland Report and/or to the Rio Earth Summit, and to the basic understanding of sustainable development that has been established by usage at such international gatherings (Lafferty, 1996; Meadowcroft, 1997a) .
Despite their common form (as official "plans" and "strategies" adopted at the level of the nation-state, and applicable to its territory), and the substantive points of similarity listed above, these national plans and strategies are in many other respects very different creatures. Some concentrate on general aspirations (UK), while others have precise goals and timetables (Netherlands). Some summarize and inter-relate existing policy commitments (Japan) , while others introduce new programs and spending initiatives (Canada) . Some have been prepared primarily on the basis of interdepartmental cooperation (Japan), while others have involved wide processes of consultation and participation (Australia). Some have turned out to be one-shot affairs, withering with changes in political priorities and personnel (Canada) , while others appear to have become formalized into a cyclical process of review and revision (Denmark) .
In conceptual terms, there appear to be important differences between national environmental policy plans on the one hand and national strategies for sustainable development on the other. Two dimensions could be involved here. First, a distinction between "environmental," and "sustainable development," policy-making. As it has passed into international political idiom, sustainable development has been associated with a series of normative objectives that transcend issues of environmental quality. Sustainable development involves reconciling the demands of economic efficiency, social equity, and environmental protection. Thus strategies for sustainable development-as envisaged in Agenda 21 for example-would need to address a much broader range of issues and involve a more encompassing effort at social visioning than would necessarily be associated with environmental policy plans. Issues of international development assistance, for example, are integral to Agenda 21 (and to the global equity dimension of sustainable development), but might not be considered within the remit of a national environmental policy plan. Second, a strategy could be understood to be something both more, or less, than a "plan." More-in the sense that it attempts to provide an overarching vision on the basis of which particular plans and policies can be elaborated (Carew-Reid et al, 1994: 9-10) ; and less-in the sense that it may lack the operational details associated with a plan.
It is probably true that the sustainable-development strategies which have been produced to date tend to be more wide-ranging and less precise about detailed targets, while environmental policy plans are somewhat more narrow and concrete. Yet in practice, the terminological distinction breaks down, because environmental policy plans have adopted sustainable development as a core conceptual framing device (even if they do not attempt to address all the policy-relevant dimensions of sustainable development); because many environmental policy plans remain quite vague about specific timetables and quantifiable objectives; and because some sustainable development strategies do not deal with all the broader policy issues associated with sustainable development in the UNCED process. A further complication arises when the term "green plans" is used also to refer to plans and strategies which have not formally been adopted by particular national governments. Elaborate orientations have been drawn up through NGO-initiated processes (for example, the Action Plan: Sustainable Netherlands, sponsored by Friends of the Earth Netherlands [Milieudefensie, 1993] ); by stakeholder interactions encouraged by public officials, but to which the government is not formally bound (for example, the Canadian Projet de Société), and by government-appointed consultative inquiries (for example, Sustainable America: a New Consensus for Prosperity, Opportunity and a Healthy Environment [President's Council on Sustainable Development, 1996] ). While such initiatives have proved to be influential, there is an important difference in principle from plans and strategies which have been adopted formally by governments.
In a pioneering study of national environmental policy plans and sustainable development strategies, Jänicke and Jörgens (1998) have suggested a number of categories through which these efforts can be assessed. They suggest three broad themes: the accuracy and relevance of goals (the type of plan and the quality of the targets); the degree of participation and integration (the lead authority, interpolicy coordination, and societal consultation); and the degree of institutionalization (legal/legislative basis, special planning institutions, reports and evaluations, and financing). This allows France's 1990 National Plan for the Environment (including administrative reform and an action plan, with mostly qualitative targets, prepared by the ministry of the environment with "negative coordination with other ministries"), to be contrasted with Austria's 1995 National Environmental Plan (a comprehensive plan with over 400 mainly qualitative goals, prepared under the auspices of the ministry of the environment in coordination with "all ministries," and after consultation with "labor and industrial associations (neo-corporatist actors)" (Jänicke and Jörgens, 1998) .
Still, it is hard to capture the complexity of national practices-in the context of very different political systems and legal and administrative cultures-in a small number of categories. This is particularly true at such a comparatively early stage in the development of these initiatives when states are trying out (and then sometimes rapidly discarding) a variety of structures, processes and policies. Even within the parameters of a single process, considerable innovation may occur between one phase and another-as with the Dutch NEPP, for example, which in its initial incarnation was produced in a relatively closed interministerial process, but which by its second iteration (NEPP2) involved more elaborate consultation with diverse social strata (van Muijen, 1997) .
There are many other dimensions on which cross-national comparison among such strategy/planning documents and exercises is worthwhile. It is, for example, important to establish how the (very fluid) idea of sustainable development is actually concretized in different national contexts; what sorts of models, paradigms and heuristic devices are employed to approach social/environmental interactions (ecological scale, ecological footprint, material cycles, and so on); what sorts of policy principle are invoked to underpin environmental management strategies (the precautionary approach, the polluter pays principle, risk analysis, product life cycle analysis, etc.); and how the portfolio of policy instruments is composed (green taxation, public education campaigns, etc.). For example, the strong emphasis on technological innovation in the Japanese plan clearly contrasts with the more socially or behaviorally focused approach of the Danish plan (Japan, 1995; Denmark, 1995) .
Long-term national environmental plans and sustainable-development strategies reflect a change in the way the management of environmental problems is being approached in the developed countries. They appear appropriate once it is understood that environmental controversies and choices have become a more or less permanent feature of governance that will require continuous adjustment and a long view. As observed by some commentators, it is clearly the case that there is still a significant symbolic component to the preparation of such plans in many countries (Buhrs and Bartlett, 1997) . They seem to be part of a ritualized politics whereby national authorities in each state act to conform with an emergent international norm (legitimized by the UN, OECD, World Bank, etc.), without intending to implement fully (or even necessarily understanding the actual implications of) the particular measure. And yet once the processes are set in motion, they may assume a life of their own, laying a framework for more substantive engagement at future iterations. And so it is possible that Jänicke and Jörgens (1998) may in time be proven right that "environmental planning of the new "Agenda 21" type is not another 'instrument' of environmental policy, but a comprehensive strategy; a permanent process of learning, setting goals, formulating and implementing measures."
When assessing these planning exercises, it is important to keep in mind the broader context of national efforts to come to terms with the challenge raised by modern environmental problems and to engage with the UNCED process. The inauguration of longer term plans and strategies is but one element of complex patterns of institutional engagement with sustainable development which have involved the establishment of government advisory bodies, measurement and monitoring systems, and networks of institutions concerned with national compliance with formal international agreements such as the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions. As yet, it is far from clear just which types of institutional innovation will actually secure the most significant gains in terms of environmental performance. For example, in the United Kingdom, considerable criticism has been leveled at the abstract and policy summarizing character of the official sustainable-development strategy document. And yet it may be that changes made in the central guidance given to local planning authorities (such as the explicit introduction of the notion of sustainable development into the Planning Policy Guidance Notes) may, over the long term, have a significant impact on the way in which issues are resolved on the ground (UK Government, 1997).
Even where a specific exercise has been set aside, other initiatives may draw on experience of the earlier process. Thus Canada, which has already launched and then quietly abandoned two distinct strategic planning/visioning exercises-the Green Plan and the Projet de Société-is now experimenting with a new system designed to integrate sustainable-development considerations into the work of government. Under its provisions, all government departments are required to submit to parliament and to periodically update official "sustainable development strategies that include the department's objectives and plans of action to further sustainable development" (Canada, 1995: 25) . A special post, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, has been created within the Office of the Auditor General, with responsibilities that include delivering an annual report to parliament on the progress of departments in achieving their sustainable development objectives.
Furthermore, it cannot necessarily be assumed that "integration" at the highest (and most abstract) level necessarily results in the best overall performance with respect to specific objectives. Thus, for example, it may not be true that strategies which attempt to deal with all the components of sustainable development make a more valuable contribution to realizing sustainable development, than do national environmental policy plans informed by the idea of sustainable development. Indeed, it is not even clear that a formal national environmental policy plan is an absolutely necessary requirement for making progress in environmental policymaking or in implementing sustainable development. Consider the case of Norway, which to date lacks a national environmental policy plan, but which has made important strides in integrating economic and environmental factors in decisionmaking through institutional innovations such as the establishment of the State Secretary Committee for Environmental Issues (1989) , and the Green Book system, whereby ministries must present environmental expenditures and assess the environmental implications of their initiatives within the annual budgetary planning process (Langhelle, 1997) .
Multipartite Environmental Governance
Another intriguing development of the past decade has been the emergence of more complex multipartite patterns of environmental governance in the industrialized countries. The trend towards what one analyst has described as "governing in terms of 'co,' such as co-steering, co-managing, co-producing and co-allocating" (Kooiman, 1993) , has not been confined to environmental issues. Ideas of public/private partnerships, negotiated regulation, and joint policy development and implementation have been applied in many issue domains-as states, slimmed down by the privatizations, deregulation and budgetary trimming of the 1980s, try to manage societal processes in the context of rapidly changing circumstances and a globalization of political and economic power (Marin and Mayntz, 1991; Rhodes, 1996) .
Yet the development of multi-actor governance networks seems particularly wellsuited to the structural characteristics of environmental problems, which are both complex and dynamic, and which crosscut traditional jurisdictional divides. This seems all the more clear with respect to decision-making for sustainable development, where environment and economy are to be linked, and the wealth, equity and ecological dimensions of policy choices are to be reconciled (Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 1996; Meadowcroft, 1998; Langhelle, this issue) .
The language of stakeholders and cooperation with major groups, of partnerships and participation, was a major theme at UNCED, and it has continued to form a mainstay of national and international approaches to implementing sustainable development. While there is little doubt that some governmental actors have in part been attracted to this idiom as a means of displacing responsibility, it also clearly reflects an increasing awareness that traditional governance approaches are inadequate to effect the long-term structural modification of production and consumption practices that sustainable development appears to imply.
Multi-actor configurations in environmental decision-making are not new. Particularly in relation to the management of large infrastructure projects (dams, highspeed rail links, airports) and complex ecosystems (river basins), complex configurations of governmental actors have often been brought together. This is especially true in federal systems where responsibility for various dimensions of public policy may be radically fragmented among diverse agencies. 4 But through the 1970s and 1980s, as the integrated character of environmental problems became increasingly appreciated, such inter-agency collaboration became more common. Negotiations of various kinds among governmental agencies and firms have also long been a feature of regulatory culture in diverse administrative contexts. What is new is the extension of such processes, the creation of new combinations of players, and the emphasis on cooperative implementation.
Among the sorts of interactions that can be referred to under the general heading of multipartite environmental governance, are negotiated environmental agreements between official agencies and firms or industrial branch organizations (such as the Netherlands covenants); interactive rule making involving regulators, industry and environmental groups (such as the United States' EPA's "Sustainable Industries Project" [Fiorino, 1996] ); conservation partnerships between government, business and environmental groups (such as the UK 2000 scheme in Britain); regionally based initiatives focused on environmental amelioration and economic regeneration (such as the Gelre Valley project in the Netherlands [Glasbergen, 1996] ); and industry and environmental group alliances such as the Forest Stewardship Council.
Experiments are going ahead with a wide range of interactions focused around a mix of problem domains, involving varied commitments from participants, and alternative time-scales. Quite different configurations of societal actors may be involved in these processes. If we think of groups as being primarily based in one of three broad spheres of social life-the governmental sector, the business sector, and the not-for-profit or NGO sector-then four different classes of cross-sectoral interactions become intelligible: (1) government/business, (2) government/NGO, (3) business/NGO, and (4) government/business/NGO (see Figure 1) .
Examples of the first class include regulatory covenants and compliance codes agreed between regulators and firms; examples of the second type include conservation initiatives and education campaigns involving collaboration between governments and environmental action groups; examples of the third class include product endorsements and audits-for-credits arrangements; and examples of the fourth class include more inclusive multi-stakeholder initiatives. Inevitably things are still more complex than this schema suggests, for within each of the three social spheres there are many different kinds of organizational actors: central, regional and local government, as well as official agencies and semi-autonomous regulatory bodies; individual companies and business organizations; NGOs ranging from national campaign organizations and conservation trusts to local community groups. Further, multipartite governance configurations can connect local and national organizations to cross-national and global processes. A product certification scheme, for example, that starts as collaboration between local environmental groups and retailers can develop cross-national linkages and be supported by official international agencies.
Viewed as frameworks within which to engage with sustainable development, each of the classes of interaction has a different potential. Government/business collaboration brings public authorities into direct contact with enterprises whose activities impose significant environmental loads, and which posses the financial and technical resources needed to address environmental problems. Government/NGO partnerships have so far largely been confined to public financing of the not-for-profit sector, to joint training and educational initiatives, service delivery and nature-conservancy activities. They can stimulate pluralistic inputs to policy debates, improve the targeting of resources and contribute to the professionalization of NGO activities. Business/NGO linkages can provide funding for environmental campaigns and favorable publicity for companies. When appropriately focused, however, they can go further by sensitizing corporations to public concerns; stimulating innovative approaches to product design and environmental burden reduction; and immersing NGOs in the practicalities of the business world and production decisions. In some ways, multisectoral collaborations offer the greatest potential for constructive interplay between different constituencies, but they are difficult to initiate and manage. Of the three social spheres mentioned above, organizations drawn from the civil society/NGO sector are perhaps the weakest, both in terms of financial and organizational resources as well as technical expertise. Yet they posses significant reserves of public trust, the potential to represent grass roots opinion, and great dynamism and variety. Recent discussion of regulatory agreements has made much of the idea of environmental covenants or performance contracts as a new instrument to achieve compliance with administratively established standards (Commission of the European Communities, 1996) . Certainly from the point of view of government agencies deciding whether to initiate a collaborative (multipartite and negotiated) approach, this option appears as one instrument-among other possible instruments-for implementing official policy and attaining agency objectives. Yet it should not be forgotten that from the perspective of other social actors, participating in such processes is a means of advancing their own organizational objectives, and of influencing governmental actors. Precisely because genuine negotiation implies a two-way process, government agencies entering into such interaction must be willing to accept that their own perceptions of problems and possibilities may be supplemented, enhanced, and altered by the perspectives of other partners. Furthermore, there are many contexts within which it is impossible for state agencies to know-in advance of the collaborative interaction itself-just what an effective solution, with an equitable distribution of burdens, will be. Thus collaborative interactions can ultimately be as much about making policy as about implementing a pre-determined orientation. This appears to be true at least in part in the well known case of the Dutch environmental covenants. In its earlier phases, Dutch target-group policy was almost entirely instrumental and hierarchical: targets were set by government; target groups (the objects of policy initiatives) were identified; and negotiations were initiated to secure target-group compliance with pre-set norms. Yet, in its most recent incarnations, the process appears to embody more of a genuine dialogue and mutual learning among interested parties (van Muijen, 1997) .
Over the past few years, political analysts have conceptualized innovative multipartite approaches to managing environment and development related decisionmaking in various ways. Pieter Glasbergen (1995) has spoken of "network management" to refer to complex configurations of actors including governmental agencies from national and/or local levels which come together to derive and jointly implement programs to manage environmental burdens. William Lafferty and James Meadowcroft (1996) have described cross-sectoral approaches which involve discursive consensus formation and collaborative problem-solving as "co-operative management regimes" (see also Meadowcroft, 1998) . Martin Enevoldsen (1998) has referred to "joint environmental policy-making" (JEP), suggesting that the variety of mechanisms can be appreciated by assessing (a) the extent of "jointness" (the range of societal and governmental partners), and (b) the degree of "voluntariness" (how far the procedure moves away from hierarchy and coercion, and toward the norms of discursive democracy) implied by the process.
Common to these conceptualizations is an emphasis on the transformative potential of collaborative interactions. Through a process of common engagement, representatives from different organizations can construct a shared approach to a problem; an approach that may imply altering their original understanding and interest perception. What is involved here, is what some analysts have referred to as "second-order" discourse or reflection, in which participants move beyond initial perceptions and instrumental reason to consider more basic understandings (Fisher, 1994) . Another crucial dimension is that these processes must be practically focused. They are not just debating forums but encounters structured to derive and then implement practical solutions to specific problems. Commenting on the possibility of collaboration in processes of technology development, the authors of a recent study maintain that:
Even if actors operate with different meanings, they can act jointly provided that these meanings are congruent-that is, provided an artefact that incorporates these various meanings can be envisaged. However such congruent meanings are to be discovered not through abstract, generic discussions . . . but through specific debates about the shared object of action, the artefact (Grin and Graff, 1996: 90).
For "artefact" here one could also read "program," "policy," or "action plan"-for the key is that interactions are focused on a concrete outcome. And, as the process moves forward to implement an agreed solution, iterative cycles of learning become possible.
Yet it should not be assumed that the proliferation of multiparty processes is without costs and risks, at least from the point of view of securing a more environmentally sustainable development trajectory (Meadowcroft, 1998) . Early experience with government/business agreements reveals a tendency to water down standards below that which might have been anticipated had regulators acted unilaterally, and this is particularly so when interactions are not transparent. Government/NGO collaboration can lead the leadership and professional staff of not-for-profit organizations to become preoccupied with the state's agenda and dependent on political handouts, rather than keeping their ears attuned to their own grass roots. Business/NGO partnerships may expose popular organizations to cooptation, or to a creeping "credibility gap," which may widen catastrophically should unsavory practices of their corporate partner be exposed or should an unexpected environmental disaster occur. For their part, companies may invest a great deal in building accords with NGO actors only to find anticipated gains soured by the intervention of more radical elements.
Multi-stakeholder processes absorb a great deal of energy, and can collapse without agreement, or else generate a lopsided outcome. Typically, this might involve a result which does not provide adequate protection for environmental endowments, but one can also project outcomes which fail to secure necessary economic gains or to integrate adequately distributional considerations. Any of these eventualities can make it more difficult to find partners for future ventures, and can raise doubts in the minds of already suspicious publics about the wisdom of such patterns of environmental governance. Indeed, they may prompt calls for a recentralization of decision-making, and a return to more traditional patterns of regulatory interaction.
Yet the basic context which has prompted government, business leaders and NGOs to explore more complex multipartite engagement with sustainable development remains. Moreover, the problems of these approaches must be balanced not just against the strengths but also against the weaknesses of traditional decisionmaking. Learning in the environmental realm is not just about learning which policies will work, but also about learning how to design multipartite processes which generate acceptable outcomes. It is in this context that one can understand recent efforts to develop practical guidance for such interactions-for example, the set of principles to orient voluntary environmental initiatives recently drawn up by a coalition of business and environmental leaders in Canada (New Directions Group, 1997).
Sustainable Cities and Local Agenda 21
Another area in which there has been considerable activity in industrialized countries over the past five years is local government engagement with sustainability initiatives and the Agenda 21 process. The ground for this was laid well before the Rio Earth Summit. Local administrations have assumed a key role in managing environmental burdens and have long had to reconcile demands for conservation of the natural and built environments with the imperatives of development. With the internationalization of the environmental agenda in the 1980s, local government officials and community activists became increasingly concerned with the relation between global problems and local responsibilities.
It was partly to confront such issues that the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) was established in 1990 with the support of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). Together with local authority representatives and organizations from many countries, the ICLEI assured the local perspective was well represented at Rio. Noting that local governments already played an important role in environment and development decision-making, and that this is "the level of governance closest to the people," Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 called on local authorities around the world to "enter into dialogue with their citizens, local organizations and private enterprises" in order to "adopt a 'local Agenda 21'" which would further public education, address local problems, and promote sustainable development (United Nations, 1993). The idea was for a local action plan-drawn up through broad participatory processes-linking global issues with local problems and priorities.
Since the UNCED meeting, Local Agenda 21 (LA21) has gradually gathered momentum, and projects and programs linked to this rubric have gone forward in many countries (Voisey et al., 1996; Lafferty and Eckerberg, 1997) . In Sweden, for example, from 1993 the Swedish Association of Local Authorities began to actively promote LA21, distributing information to its members and conducting surveys of local initiatives. By the end of 1996, more than half of Swedish local governments had appointed LA21 "coordinators." A recent study suggests that accomplishments are modest: budgets remain small (averaging £36 000 per authority), and the majority of projects remain related to "problems which are relatively easy to grasp and which are within the power of local government to influence," such as waste management, green purchasing, water management and energy (Eckerberg, Forsberg and Wickenberg, 1997: 61.) On the other hand, however, the same authors report there is now evidence that Swedish authorities may be beginning to link LA21 to more challenging issues such as fossil fuel dependence and local infrastructure development.
In the Netherlands about a quarter of local governments had initiated LA21 projects by 1996 (Coenen, 1997) . This was encouraged by the inclusion of LA21 on a list of action priorities for which municipalities could receive additional funding from the central government. Interestingly, the local administrations which most actively embraced the LA21 idea were not necessarily those with the most advanced existing environmental policy, but rather those which were most conscious of the need to catch up to nationally established environmental performance targets (Coenen, 1997: 188-191) . Many UK local authorities have also taken up Agenda 21. Here too the sectoral liaison association-the Local Government Management Board-has assumed a lead role in providing information, guidelines, and regular activity reports. Participation is a key theme in the UK approaches, with most authorities engaged in LA21 activities emphasizing public inputs, and some committed to bottom-up processes that assign a central role to the citizenry in the preparation of local action plans (Young, 1996) .
A recent study of LA21 activity in eight European countries suggests that initiatives in Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are particularly welldeveloped (Lafferty and Eckerberg, 1997) . The authors of the comparative analysis refer to these three countries as "pioneers" in the LA21 implementation effort. In contrast, Germany, Ireland and Austria are described as "late comers"-displaying relative disinterest in LA21; while Finland and Norway are classed as "adapters," occupying an intermediate position characterized by a slow start, followed later by active efforts to integrate LA21 into local government priorities. While these analysts conclude that it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the longterm significance of LA21 activities in Europe, they suggest that a further extension of local government initiatives in this area is quite possible as countries (such as Germany), which hitherto have been relatively inactive, devote increased resources and attention to the issue.
There are many factors which militate against local authorities making significant progress in addressing sustainable development. Local government is often seriously strapped for cash-and this is particularly true in regions suffering relative decline and where economic, social and environmental problems may be acute. In many countries the power of local government is tightly constrained by national law and policies. More particularly, innovative planning processes such as LA21 risk being pushed toward the margins by existing planning modalities and/or falling victim to well-established interest coalitions within city halls. Furthermore, the comprehensive and participatory dimensions-which many view as the major strength of LA21-may ultimately turn out to be problems. The broad range of the program itself may contribute to difficulties in achieving concrete results, and participatory processes are notoriously difficult to manage.
Nevertheless, it is hard to overstate the dynamism and inventiveness which local government officials and locally-based groups are deploying in order to develop new ways of tackling environmental problems. There are initiatives to protect local green spaces, enhance urban landscapes as wildlife habitats, improve mass transit systems, increase energy efficiency, and reduce waste generation. In addition to Agenda 21, the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions have also served as foci for activity, with local government initiatives to protect biodiversity and/or to reduce greenhouse gas emissions occupying a high profile in a number of countries. For example, the Canadian city of Toronto used receipts from the sale of municipal land to establish a C$20 million Toronto Atmospheric Fund (TAF) which is to finance projects to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from sources in the municipality. A Strategic Action Plan for carbon dioxide reduction has been drawn up with priorities placed on upgrading city-owned buildings and facilities, extending the district heating system, improving energy efficiency in residential and commercial buildings, strengthening building codes, and examining land-use and transport practices. Similar initiatives are being encouraged by ICLEI's "Cities for Climate Protection Campaign" in urban centers such as Denver, Minneapolis, Bologna, Hanover and Copenhagen. 5 The idea of local/global linkages is a powerful one, and it has received considerable impetus from cross-national interaction among municipal officials, local planners, and activists, which has been promoted by international bodies. For example, the World Health Organization's (WHO) "Healthy Cities Project," the Council for European Municipalities and Regions, and the European Commission (DGXI) have jointly supported the networking associated with the European Sustainable Cities and Towns Campaign. This Campaign was launched with the adoption of the Aalborg Charter at the first European Conference on Sustainable Cities and Towns in May 1994. Initially signed by 80 municipalities and a host of NGO and governmental representatives, this Charter had been endorsed by more than 300 European cities and towns by June 1997. The Charter emphasizes that 80 percent of the European population lives in urban areas, and municipal initiatives must, therefore, have a central place in the quest for sustainable development. A key feature of this document is the insistence that sustainable development implies preserving and investing in "natural capital." Participating authorities are pledged to do their utmost to protect environmental assets of urban areas, to conserve habitats and species, and to improve efficiency in the utilization of water and energy. Considerable importance is placed on social equity issues and community involvement in environmental initiatives. The central place of urban planning, and the need for accurate measurement and monitoring of environmental loads and urban trends are affirmed. The third part of the Charter contains a pledge by participating municipalities to develop LA21 initiatives in the coming years.
Conclusion
This article has considered three recent developments in the politics of sustainable development in industrialized countries: national environmental plans and strategies for sustainable development; multipartite environmental governance; and Sustainable Cities and Local Agenda 21 initiatives. Over the past decade each of these phenomena has emerged as political actors and institutions have tried to deal with the expanding sphere of environmental problems, and to come to terms with the political and policy implications of sustainable development.
The discussion here has not been intended as an exhaustive survey of recent trends; indeed, it is not even claimed that the three issues raised are necessarily the most important of the emergent political phenomena accompanying engagement with sustainable development. Other issues could have been highlighted, for example, green taxation. Up until now, experiments with carbon dioxide levies, urban road pricing, and resource charges have been confined to relatively innovative jurisdictions. But a large-scale switch to environment-based taxation is not inconceivable, and such a shift in the fiscal foundation of the state would have profound implications for macro-economic management, employment and welfare policies.
Or, consider the problem of trade and environment linkages. While this was no more than a marginal concern during the Uruguay Round of GATT, it has increasingly preoccupied decision-makers in the 1990s. Biotechnology-which to date has been more or less the exclusive purview of a narrow policy community-is also set to expand in political salience in the coming decade. Corporate engagement with environmental issues is another domain of enormous and accelerating change, and-after Kyoto-the politics of national and international climate change can be expected to increase in complexity and significance.
Yet the three examples discussed in this article are adequate to illustrate the extent to which environment and sustainable development have come to occupy the attention of political actors, and the degree to which they are provoking shifts in patterns of institutional behavior. Each of these three developments bears on themes that have long been of interest to students of politics. National environmental policy plans and sustainable development strategies are of relevance to established debates about social and economic planning practices, and about the potential for government to consciously reorient the path of societal development (Meadowcroft, 1997b) . Multipartite environmental governance relates to questions concerning interactions between states and organized interests-to issues of pluralism, corporatism and interest intermediation. Sustainable Cities and Local Agenda 21 bring to the fore local/national/international linkages which are pertinent to discussions of sovereignty, autonomy and globalization. Moreover, all three of these phenomena intersect in different ways with issues of democracy and citizen participation.
Over the past two decades numerous scholars have contributed to opening up the study of environmental politics: theorists such as Dryzek (1987) , Paelhke (1988) and Weale (1992) ; comparativists such as Andersen (1994) , Vogel (1986) and Jänicke (1992) ; and students of public policy such as Andrews (1976) and Cohen and Kamieniecki (1991) . And yet much of the writing on environmental politics and policy remains tangential to the concerns of the main body of the discipline. It is true that focus on a substantive policy domain can be conducive to ghettoization. But this also stems from a common perception of the relative (in)significance of the appropriate societal players. Environmental ministries have long been viewed as juniors to spending departments and finance ministries; corporate environmental initiatives have been judged as little more than public relations exercises; and environmental organizations have often been viewed as simply part of a protesting fringe.
Today these perceptions are less accurate than ever. In many countries, environment ministries and agencies are emerging as important actors, while issues of environment and sustainable development have begun to permeate the work of government as a whole. Corporations take environmental politics more and more seriously; and environmental non-governmental organizations can muster significant resources.
In light of the increasing pressures that industrial development and rising human numbers are placing on the global environment, problems of environmental governance and sustainable development seem destined to occupy a central place in the operation of political systems in the early decades of the next century. Perhaps it is also time that such concerns moved closer to the core of the discipline of political science.
Notes
1. Much of the information for Table 1 and for the section on "National Environmental Policy Plans and Strategies for Sustainable Development' is derived from draft reports from the project on "Implementing Sustainable Development in High-Consumption
